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Leadership and Innovation

Army Modernization in the 21st Century
Michael E. Lynch
ABSTRACT: Harsh lessons from the failure of the US Army’s future
combat system a decade ago continue to haunt Army modernization
efforts today. The advent of Army Futures Command and changes
to the modernization and acquisitions process signal progress
toward exorcising these ghosts of the past, enabling the Army to
work with rather than against industry as it formulates its future
combat systems requirements.

T

he failure of the US Army’s future combat systems (FCS)
program destroyed the public’s confidence in the Army’s
modernization processes. The Army’s latest modernization
strategy, however, reflects a unity of purpose and structure unseen since
World War II. The creation of Army Futures Command in 2018 provided
an opportunity to reform and improve modernization processes that had
been plaguing Army combat developments for decades. Inculcating hard
lessons from the failure of FCS to sufficiently reform modernization
and acquisition processes, Futures Command has labored to improve
these modernization programs. But as it looks to the future, as its name
demands, it should examine the causes of previous failures with an
eye toward preventing them. An examination of the recent request for
proposals for the optionally manned fighting vehicle (OMFV) in 2019
and again in early 2020 provides compelling lessons learned that can
promulgate future success.1

Ghost of Systems Past and Concepts Future

The ghost of FCS haunts Army modernization and provides a
cautionary tale for innovators and futurists. The FCS program, the
largest planned modernization program in Army history, planned 18
separate systems integrated by a wireless network in a brigade structure
and operating under emerging doctrine. The program aimed to provide
weapons, individual computer systems, manned and unmanned vehicles,
and a sensor suite. All vehicles would be transportable by C-130 and
would be “more lethal, survivable, deployable, and sustainable than
existing heavy combat systems.”2 After nine years and $87 billion, the
Department of Defense canceled the FCS program in 2009.3
The FCS was haunted by the ghost of systems past—the so-called
Big 5: M1 Abrams, M2/3 Bradley, UH-60 Black Hawk, AH-64 Apache,
1. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Cross-Functional Team Pilot In Support Of
Materiel Development, Army Directive 2017-14 (Washington, DC: HQDA, October 6, 2017).
2. US Government Accountability Office (GAO), Issues Facing the Army’s Future Combat Systems
Program, GAO-03-1010R (Washington, DC: GAO, 2003), 2; and Christopher G. Pernin et al., Lessons
from the Army’s Future Combat Systems Program (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), 55.
3. Mark L. Bradley, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 2009 (Washington, DC:
Center of Military History, 2015), 42–43.
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and the Patriot.4 Modernization enthusiasts often incorrectly assume
the Big 5 were developed together. Though the systems were called
the Big 5 as early as 1972 for acquisition purposes, they remained five
separate modernization programs, four of which began as product
improvements to systems being replaced. Each spent an average of 17
years in development, and the changes they brought were evolutionary
rather than revolutionary.5 The final products fielded in the 1980s were
all tremendous improvements over the original designs in the 1960s,
and the improved versions that have seen combat from Desert Storm
to the present were orders of magnitude better than their predecessors.
The AirLand Battle Doctrine, developed as a result of the Yom Kippur
War and using the capabilities of these new systems, really made them
successful as the Big 5.6
The FCS program was also haunted by the ghost of concept future,
the Army After Next, which envisioned development of systems over
a period of decades using technologies as yet unknown. The program
hoped to marry the idea of simultaneous acquisition with modernization
using leap-ahead technology. But an ambitious yet unfeasible operational
concept, immature technology, and an overly aggressive timeline
doomed the program to failure. Current modernization programs must
avoid these ghosts within the machine in order to succeed where other
programs failed.

Unfeasible Operational Concepts

General Eric Shinseki’s vision of the Army unveiled in October
1999, required the capability to deploy a brigade anywhere in the world
in 96 hours with a full division on the ground in 120 hours, and five
divisions in 30 days.7 This flawed operational concept required a C-130
sortie for each of the two-to-three-hundred light armored vehicles in
an FCS brigade combat team. Large operations would require hundreds
of C-130s, likely making the plan unfeasible. The C-130 requirement
came from a notional vertical takeoff and landing aircraft designed
to support futuristic forces during Army After Next war games. This
theoretical aircraft used the internal cube of the C-130, so the mission
needs statement defined C-130 deployability as critical to achieving both
“‘rapid tactical and strategic air deployment’” and therefore “the only
‘non-tradable requirement.’”8
The FCS concept supposedly eliminated the need for heavily
armored vehicles by replacing mass with superior information allowing
the soldier to see and hit the enemy first. The FCS brigade combat team
would have the capability to “see first, understand first, act first, and to

4. David C. Trybula, “Big 5” Lessons for Today and Tomorrow (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War
College, 2012), 3.
5. Trybula, Big 5, 11, 26, 41, 51, 58.
6. Pernin, Future Combat Systems, 9.
7. Pernin, Future Combat Systems, 9.
8. Pernin, Future Combat Systems, 16, 55–57.
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finish decisively.”9 The system survivability depended upon “its ability to
detect and kill the enemy beyond direct combat range,” while avoiding
detection itself and surviving the enemy’s first shot.10
The challenge with ground vehicles has always been the balance
between weight and armor. Initial planning for C-130 transportability
imposed a 20-ton limit on the vehicle assuming perfect conditions
operating at sea level, while the add-on armor and reserve fuel for the
C-130 (normal for combat missions) further reduced the maximum
payload to 17 tons. Additionally, assault landings enabling the
operational scheme overly stressed the airframes, which resulted in the
requirement for an even lower payload. To reduce the vehicle weight,
developers repeatedly decreased mandatory deployment configurations,
but these conflicted with the operational concept requiring the FCS to
be combat ready upon deployment. The military’s experience in Iraq
and Afghanistan, moreover, proved no amount of tactical intelligence
could replace physical force protection from improvised explosive
devices, refuting the operational concept’s reliance on intelligence to
overcome the need for protective armor. This fact drove an operational
need for more heavily armored vehicles such as mine-resistant,
ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles.

Immature Technology

As the pace of technological change has accelerated, the Army has
sought to take advantage of new, emergent, and possible technology,
always looking for the “leap ahead.” The FCS project manager
identified 31 critical technology elements whose readiness determined
the system’s effectiveness. A technology readiness assessment in 2003
found significant problems, neither new nor unexpected.11 A 2003
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report warned, “many
critical technologies will not be mature at Milestone B [acquisition
program start], thus technology development and product development
will occur concurrently.”12 Congress ordered an investigation of the
FCS program in 2009 and determined few things had changed with the
program in the intervening six years.13 These warnings went unheeded.
A RAND Corporation study of FCS in 2012 determined,
“technical development must be rooted in exploratory basic science
and advanced development programs validated by early and realistic
field experimentation with real products, and not in SDD [Systems
Development and Demonstration] phases of major acquisition
programs.”14 The FCS program proved the danger of attempting to leap
too far ahead.
9. GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Decisions Needed to Shape Army’s Combat Systems for the Future, GAO09-288 (Washington, DC: GAO, 2009), 3.
10. GAO, Future Combat Systems Program, 30.
11. GAO, Future Combat Systems Program, 24–25.
12. GAO, Future Combat Systems Program, 41.
13. GAO, Defense Acquisitions, 10.
14. Pernin, Future Combat Systems, xxvii, 242.
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Rush to Failure

An artificially accelerated timeline driven by the desire to jumpstart transformation became a primary cause of the FCS system
failure. In 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pressured
the Army to modernize and adapt to emerging threats, reduce the
logistics infrastructure, increase lethality, and speed deployment time.
The term revolution in military affairs distinguished the effort from
previous evolutionary changes of the 1990s.15 Despite the immature
technology, Army senior leaders accelerated the timeline for Milestone
B from 2006 to 2003, effectively dooming the program by eliminating
time to correct deficiencies as they appeared.16

Army Modernization Strategy

The Army seems to be in a golden period now with the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan winding down and no new near-term threats.
The 2018 National Defense Strateg y articulates, “long-term strategic
competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities . . .
because of the magnitude of the threats” and the potential for them
to increase in the future.17 While the United States competes below
the level of armed conflict, the Army is using the time to modernize
decades-old equipment quickly to avoid facing the next war with
inferior weapons. The 2019 Army Modernization Strateg y is based on four
key assumptions:
•• The US Army’s budget remains flat with reduced spending power
over time.
•• Demand for Army forces remains relatively constant.
•• Research and development matures in time to make significant
improvements in Army capabilities by 2035.
•• Adversary modernization programs stay on their currently
estimated trajectories in terms of capability levels and timelines.18
The strategy also outlines a 15-year plan to build an Army for a new
doctrine, multidomain operations (MDO).
Period of rapid change:
•• Fiscal year (FY)2020 to FY2022: Begin initial fielding of the
cross-functional teams’ signature efforts.
•• FY2023 to FY2025: Adapt formations and organizational designs
to incorporate the modernized equipment required for MDO.
15. Pernin, Future Combat Systems, 9.
16. Conrad C. Crane, Michael E. Lynch, and Shane Reilly, A History of the Army’s Future: 1990–
2018 (Carlisle, PA: US Army Heritage and Education Center, 2018), 7, 20.
17. James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America:
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of
Defense, 2018), 4.
18. HQDA, 2019 Army Modernization Strategy: Investing in the Future (Washington, DC: HQDA,
2019), 3.
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Period of fundamental change:
•• FY2026 to FY2028: Certify first MDO force package and begin
building the second. Field optionally manned fighting vehicle and
future attack reconnaissance aircraft.
•• FY2029 to FY2035: Finish certifying next force package while
continuing to innovate.19

Deus Ex Machina—Army Futures Command

The role of Army Futures Command as a modernization
headquarters allows the Army to consolidate and focus modernization
and acquisition efforts; its initial development has proceeded with an
eye toward correcting past failures, merging all technological research,
modernization, and capability development processes into one command
to better focus those efforts. Six priorities drive the Army’s equipment
modernization strategy: long-range precision fires, next-generation
combat vehicles, future vertical lift, networks, air and missile defense,
and soldier lethality.20
Eight new cross-functional teams (all the above, plus assured
positioning and timing, and synthetic training environment) focus
modernization programs. Each cross-functional team is led by a
senior military or civilian leader and includes specialists in acquisition,
requirements, science and technology, test and evaluation, resourcing,
contracting, cost analysis, sustainment, and military operations. These
cross-functional teams develop capabilities, leveraging industry,
academia, and soldiers in an iterative process to inform materiel
solutions, ensuring appropriate stakeholders are represented, empowered,
and connected.21
Lack of coordination in the research and development area has
plagued the modernization system, leading to fragmented efforts. Future
Command’s new Combat Capabilities Development Command aligned
each of the Research, Development, and Engineering Centers as lead
support to one or more of the cross-functional teams and as supporting
efforts to others (see table 1).
With the failure of FCS still fresh in the Army’s consciousness,
Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy challenged the modernization
community to “fail early, fail cheap.”22 The January 2020 cancellation of
the OMFV request for proposals provides an example of this dictum.
The Army realized the project was on the wrong track and needed a
course correction: “the most prudent means of ensuring long-term
programmatic success is to get this multibillion-dollar effort correct.”23
19. HQDA, Army Modernization Strategy, 10–11.
20. HQDA, Army Modernization Strategy, 6.
21. Pernin, Future Combat Systems, 103; and HQDA, Cross-Functional Team Pilot.
22. John M. Donnelly, “The Army’s Ryan McCarthy Pulls the Plug on Bad Acquisitions,” Roll
Call, January 18, 2020.
23. Sean Kimmons, “Vice Chief of Staff: Speed of Modernization No Longer at
‘Glacial Pace’,” Army News Service, Feb. 7, 2020, https://www.army.mil/article/232408
/vice_chief_of_staff_speed_of_modernization_no_longer_at_glacial_pace.
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This cancellation also set off alarm bells throughout the defense media
and Congress, both questioning whether this was not just the latest in
a long string of Army modernization and acquisition failures—a valid
question given the Army’s recent history.
Table 1. Army Research, Development, and Engineering Centers’ assignments to
cross-functional teams24
Combat Capabilities Development Command (CCDC) Components
(former name in parenthesis)
Armaments
Center

Chemical
Biological
Center

C5ISR
Center

Army
Research
Laboratory

Aviation &
Missile Center

Ground
Vehicle
Systems
Center

Soldier
Center

Army
Priorities

(ARDEC)

(ECBC)

(CERDEC)

(unchanged)

(AMERDEC)

(TARDEC)

(NSSC)

1

LRPF

LEAD

support

support

support

2

NGCV

support

support

support

support

3

FVL

support

support

support

LEAD

4

Network

LEAD

support

support

5

AMD

support

support

support

LEAD

6

SL

support

support

support

support

LEAD

support

LEAD

Air & Missile Defense (AMD)
Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center (ARDEC)
Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering Center (AMERDEC)
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C5ISR)
Communications-Electronics Research, Development, and Engineering Center (CERDEC)
Edgewood Chemical and Biological Command (ECBC)
Future Vertical Lift (FVL)
Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF)
Natick Soldier Systems Center (NSSC)
Network (Network)
Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV)
Soldier Lethality (SL)
Tank Automotive Research, Development, and Engineering Center (TARDEC)

Despite the Army claiming to have learned from failures such as
the FCS, the initial OMFV request for proposals in March 2019 began
with some of the same traits as FCS—unreasonable expectations and
an impossible timeline.25 The Army intended to issue an ambitious draft
requirement in order to push industry to provide the best solutions then
get industry feedback and adjust as required.
In addition to the age-old vehicle weight problem, height became a challenge.
Recent combat experience shows ground clearance enhances land mine
survivability. Industry leaders warned the Army that some requirements
24. Table data from US Army in Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army R&D Chief: ‘I Don’t
Think We Went Far Enough’—But Futures Command Can,’” Breaking Defense, February
8, 2019, fig. 1, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/02/army-rd-chief-i-dont-think-we-went
-far-enough-but-futures-command-can/.
25. Ashley Tressel, “Army Releases Final RFP for OMFV,” Inside Defense, March 29, 2019.

Leadership and Innovation

Lynch

83

were unattainable and requested modifications. The Army subsequently
removed the requirement to transport a full nine-soldier infantry
squad—the original purpose of the vehicle. The objective requirement
called for a 50mm cannon with a 30mm acceptable as an interim. With
an added Modular Active Protection System, the vehicle was required to
defeat rocket-propelled grenades, missiles, and long-rod penetrators.26
Army leaders argued soldier survivability was paramount yet sacrificed armor
to remove weight. The Army remained just as focused on air transport as it
had been during the FCS development, distorting OMFV development.
The required protection was reduced making the vehicles light enough
for two to fly on a C-17 as the Bradley does today.
Soldier survivability and vehicle reliability were compromised in order to achieve
impossible standards. Part of this survivability lies in the potential to take
soldiers out of it completely, hence optionally manned, but the vehicle
would still be remotely controlled by soldiers. Bidders had roughly six
months to produce a working prototype for testing.27
Although Congress and the press criticized the Army’s cancellation
of the OMFV request for proposals in January 2020 to start over again,
the restart was actually good news and indicates the Army’s willingness
and ability to learn from its own mistakes.28 It is also visible evidence of
the ability of Futures Command to change the landscape.
In April 2020, the Army unveiled a new and innovative approach
to designing the OMFV. It began by soliciting ideas from industry, first
on what vendors found difficult about the initial request for proposals,
and then requested recommendations for how to revise OMFV
development.29 The Army released an Industry Day Narrative listing broad
characteristics rather than specific requirements for the OMFV (see
table 2).30 It ranked survivability first among nine desired characteristics
and also relaxed air transportability as a firm requirement for the first
time since the FCS period, almost 10 years ago.
Table 2. Nine desired characteristics
Survivability

Lethality

Transportability

Mobility

Weight

Manning

Growth

Logistics

Training

26. Freedberg Jr., “NGCV: Hard Choices in Bradley Replacement, RFP Out Friday,” Breaking
Defense, March 27, 2019.
27. Freedberg Jr., “NGCV: Hard Choices.”
28. Freedberg Jr., “Can the Army Convince Congress It’s Learned from FCS?” Breaking
Defense, March 16, 2020.
29. HQDA, “Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) Market Survey,” SAM.gov, https://
beta.sam.gov/opp/37a6d32f8ef34272bd94c8340f05dd41/view.
30. National Advanced Mobility Consortium (NAMC), Industry Day Narrative for Optionally
Manned Fighting Vehicle (Ann Arbor, MI: NAMC, April 9, 2020), 6.
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The timeline for the OMFV, with five specific phases, is much more
realistic:
•• Phase 1 (FY2020 to FY2021): Develop and refine OMFV
acquisition and ontracting strategies
•• Phase 2 (FY2022 to FY2023): Preliminary design
•• Phase 3 (FY2023 to FY2024): Detailed design
•• Phase 4 (FY2024 to FY2027): Prototype build and test
•• Phase 5 (FY2027 to FY2030): Production and fielding31
Finally, the Army seemed to recognize the impossibility of
transporting large numbers of armored vehicles by air. The Industry Day
Narrative acknowledges units will still primarily deploy by water with the
option to deploy by air. Not limiting deployability to one specific airframe
allows more flexibility to continue to deploy primarily by water. The
narrative also acknowledges the continued requirement for protective
armor, but those requirements are more realistic—the OMFV must
protect its crew from other infantry fighting vehicles, not from tanks.
Elimination of tank main gun survivability makes the armor problem
much easier.32
Perhaps the most important part about the narrative, however, is the
new approach to design. One sentence indicates the Army’s final rejection
of the old FCS-type process—“the Army recognizes the importance
of accurately defining the capabilities without over constraining the
design.”33 This approach encourages industry to use virtual reality and
modeling and simulation in providing initial digital designs rather than
demanding a prototype within six months, demonstrating the Army’s
willingness to be much more open and sensible, listening to expert
opinions from industry. This approach is an improvement—during the
FCS program some contractors complained overzealous Army combat
developers had vision but no practical knowledge. They reported that
when they told developers certain things were impossible with existing
technology, the developers replied, “work the problems harder.”34

Trouble Ahead?

Despite evidence of good news, the original request for proposals
process revealed a potential problem between the modernization and
acquisition communities. GAO had previously identified a lack of formal
coordination procedures between Futures Command and the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), despite
early attempts at aligning the processes.35 In October 2019, defense
31. NAMC, Industry Day Narrative, 3–4.
32. NAMC, Industry Day Narrative, 3, 9.
33. NAMC, Industry Day Narrative, 4.
34. Pernin, Future Combat Systems, xx, 58n, 102.
35. Army Should Take Steps to Reduce Risk: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land
Forces, House Committee on Armed Services, 116th Cong. (May 1, 2019) (statement of Jon Ludwigson,
Acting Director, Contracting and National Security Acquisitions), 10.
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media outlets reported that after Bradley manufacturer BAE Systems
Land & Armaments dropped out of the OMFV competition, the Army
disqualified Raytheon Rheinmetall Land Systems for not shipping the
prototype shipped from Germany in time. Army Futures Command had
insisted at the time that the process must stick to the schedule, but the
acquisition community favored an extension. Restarting the process has
reset the clock to zero but the Army needs better coordination between
the modernization and acquisition communities.36

Conclusion

Failure is the ghost in the Army modernization machine but one
that can be exorcised. The new modernization strategy has changed
the nature of the machine, and Army Futures Command is the deus
ex machina, providing a unified infrastructure with which to conduct a
new, coherent, reasonable modernization strategy. The Army frequently
uses the phrase “lessons learned,” but very often the lessons are only
gathered rather than learned. The recent restart of the OMFV indicates
the Army might finally be learning the harsh lessons taught by the FCS
experience. If those lessons truly have been learned and the experiences
passed on to the rest of the modernization enterprise, the Army need no
longer fear the ghosts in the machine.

36. Jen Judson, “Lynx 41 Disqualified from Bradley Replacement Competition,” Breaking
Defense, October 4, 2019.

